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This paper explores the relation between family values and options for social 
policies of representative citizens from thirty European societies, constituting 
member and applicant countries of the European Union. It seeks to understand the 
values and value orientations supporting specific family structures and options for 
social policies of distinct groups of nations, corresponding to the various waves of 
accession or application for membership to the European Union. These include 
European Union (EU) members identified for an IPROSEC (Improving Policy 
Responses and Outcomes to Socio-Economic Challenges: changing family 
structures, policy and practice) project according to their welfare system and wave 
ofEU accession as Continental (France, Germany, Italy [joined in 1951]), Universal 
(United Kingdom, Ireland [1973]), Latin Rim (Greece [1981], Spain [1986]) and 
Nordic (Sweden [1995]) countries; post-communist (Hungary [applied in 1994], 
Poland [ 1994] , Estonia [ 1995]) and Mediterranean (Malta [ 1990]) applicant 
countries (Hantrais 2001); and the remaining countries taken together: members, 
applicant and non-applicant countries of the European Union. 
Theory 
Social policies are profoundly affected by the wider cultures that surround them 
and into which they are delivered. Nevertheless, very few comparative studies of 
welfare have taken social values seriously. In fact, over the past fifty years academic 
social policy has avoided the issue of culture - understood as the values and norms 
represented in social behaviour - and its effects on welfare development. Whenever 
culture was taken into consideration, it was seen as the context and the problem 
rather than the source of welfare values. The modernist view held that social policy 
should be used to change social values (Baldock 2000: 122-126). By contrast, 
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contemporary sociologists are adopting new approaches and examine the impact 
of everyday life activities on social welfare (Cahill 1994). A few others analyse 
welfare ideologies (George and Wilding 1994), and elaborate theories emerging 
from modern and late modern thinkers on welfare (George and Page 1995). More 
recently, Esping-Anderson (1999: 5) has observed how public welfare is an 
expression of social values that are predominant when welfare services come to be 
institutionalised. Of course, the crucial question is which values, and whose values 
are institutionalised into welfare systems. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the observed economic and social 
changes of late modernity is leading to substantial cultural shifts often identified as 
post-materialism (Inglehart 1990, 1997) and its related post-traditional (Abela 1991, 
2000; Harding, Phillips and Fogarty 1986), individualised (Ester, Halman and 
deMoor 1993) and masculine-feminine components (Abela 2000; van Deth and 
Scarbrough 1995). Distinct social groups are becoming increasingly differentiated 
in terms of the risks they face and the values they hold, and that these changes have 
profound implications for social policy. In this social context, sociologists are 
investigating the fit between culture and social policies. They have come to examine 
whether and if so how the values of people from distinct social groupings - as 
distinct from the values of elite leaders and their respective organisations of the 
post-war welfare state - have an impact on and shape social policy. The post-
industrial context is marked by "Third way" or "eclectic social policy", where culture 
is believed "riven with particularistic, contradictory, shifting sometimes bigoted, 
often exclusive value positions" (Baldock 2000: 132-134). 
The task ahead is to identify those value priorities and their related issues in 
social policy that command the support of significant majorities in the European 
countries under consideration. Accordingly, the current study seeks to identify 
differences and similarities between and within the European countries under 
consideration. It explores the factors contributing to socially differentiated value 
orientations and the corresponding policy options. What is the relation between 
traditional/materialist and post-traditional/post-materialist value orientations and 
social policy? Is the left-right political divide relevant to understand differences in 
policy options of distinct social groupings and of specific groups of countries with 
similar welfare systems in Europe? Alternatively is the left-right divide giving way 
to middle ground positions, variously identified as "Third Way" politics? Is there 
any discernible convergence between European member- and applicant-countries 
on core value orientations and the corresponding options for social policy? 
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Methods 
A draft questionnaire for the third wave of the European Values Study (EVS) 
was first drawn up in English and then translated into all other languages where the 
study was to be carried out. It was then pre-tested in all participant countries, and 
the final version of the questionnaire was agreed upon at a methodology meeting 
for all principal investigators held at the end of January 1999 in Leuven. Fieldwork 
was carried out during 1999 and 2000 in over thirty participant countries. The first 
comprehensive EVS data file was available for analysis exclusively to EVS 
participants by January 200 l. The English version of the EVS (1999/2000) 
questionnaire is reproduced in the source book of the third wave of the European 
Values Study (Halman. ed. 2001:299-334) and in a comparative study of values 
(Abela 2000: 294-327). 
In all participant countries a random sample of over 1000 respondents was drawn 
from the total adult population, 18 years and older. For the eleven countries under 
consideration an over~ll sample of 15,120 was obtained. A total of 38,881 respondents 
were obtained from 30 European countries. Specially trained interviewers carried 
out interviews in the homes of respondents. To ascertain comparability between 
countries the data file was weighted by age and gender. [Table 1]. 
The following study reports results from questions on family values and social 
policies of representative citizens from thirty European societies, including member 
and applicant countries of the European Union. These are France, Germany and 
Italy; United Kingdom, Ireland and Northern Ireland; Greece and Spain; Sweden; 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia; Malta. Together they represent different types of welfare 
systems including the Continental, Universal, Latin Rim, Nordic, and post-
communist group of countries. Results for the five types of welfare systems are 
compared with the average for all eleven countries as well as with the average for 
all thirty European countries taken together, and where appropriate by a breakdown 
for each separate country. As the resultant European average is not restricted to the 
values of the European Union, but includes those of Northern, Western, Eastern 
and Southern European countries, it is more representative than the one obtained in 
earlier studies (Abela 1991, 2000). 
Profile of sample 
All over Europe, generally, there are more women than men respondents. Thus 
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in the eleven IRPOSEC European countries taken together women (53%) outnumber 
men (47%) respondents. Only in Nordic Sweden the two genders are equally 
represented. In most countries, older people (over 55 years old) are equally 
represented as their younger (18-34 years old) and middle-aged (35-54 years old) 
counterparts. The Universal and Latin Rim Mediterranean countries of the European 
Union report a higher percentage of younger adults relative to their Continental 
counterparts who have higher percentages of older people. Nordic Sweden, Latin 
Malta and post-communist EU applicant countries have higher percentages of 
middle-aged people. Such a situation reflects a greater longevity, that of women in 
particular, in increasing ageing European societies. 
Quite a few IPROSEC respondents, older citizens from Mediterranean and 
Universal welfare state countries in particular, do not have an adequate schooling. 
Many others (23%) have only a primary level of education. Quite a few ( 11 % ), 
however, in addition to a terminal primary education have completed basic 
vocation training. This is the case in continental countries ( 14% ), but even more 
so in post-communist applicant countries of the European Union (25%). Many 
others have reached a secondary level of education (13%) or its equivalent in 
vocational training (7% ). Others (17%) have completed a maturity qualification 
or an upper-secondary level of education. Quite a few (8%), especially those 
from Nordic Sweden (23%), have completed a university first degree. A few 
others (9%), respondents from Universal welfare states (20%) in particular, 
obtained a post-graduate qualification. 
More than half of respondents in the eleven countries under consideration (52%), 
those from Universal (56%) and Nordic (62%) in contrast to Latin Rim (43%) 
welfare states, are chief wage earners in their household. In the same way, 
respondents from Nordic Sweden (53%, 10%, 35%) and post-communist applicant 
countries (42%, 3%, 29%) are more likely to be in full-time, part-time or on 
retirement pensions than their counterparts from Latin Rim (33%, 9%, 13%), 
Continental (36%, 9%, 22%) or Universal (36%, 11 %, 18%) welfare states. In fact, 
relative to the IPROSEC average (12%) greater percentages from Mediterranean 
Malta (31 %), the Latin Rim (21 %), Universal (15%) and Continental (13%) countries 
but not from post-communist applicant countries ( 4%) are housewives. The highest 
rates of unemployment are reported in the post -communist countries (8% ), but also 
in Universal (7%) welfare states of the European Union. Of all unemployed men 
and women, the long-term (over two years) unemployed are more likely to be found 
in Mediterranean Malta (54%) as well as in Universal (47%) and Continental (38%) 
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welfare states than in post-communist applicant countries (27%) or Latin Rim (22%) 
welfare states of the European Union. 
With respect to living arrangements, quite a few respondents, in the main younger 
adults from Latin Mediterranean, Malta and post-communist applicant countries 
but fewer from Continental and Universal welfare states live with their parents. By 
contrast, very few respondents from Nordic Sweden (6%) live with their parents. 
Generally in all European countries under consideration, the majority of respondents 
(69%), those from Mediterranean Malta (76%) and Latin Rim EU welfare states 
(71 %) in particular, have a stable relationship with a partner of the opposite sex. 
Generally, the greatest majority of those in stable relationship are also legally married 
to their partner (82%). However lower percentages of respondents with a stable 
relationship from Nordic Sweden (70%) and Universal welfare states (68%) are 
actually married to their partner. Relative to their other European counterparts (28% ), 
prior to their current relationship the latter (46%, 45%) are more likely to have had 
a stable relationship with another partner. 
Similarly, fewer respondents from Nordic Sweden (47%) and the Universal 
welfare states (48%), in contrast to their counterparts from Malta (67%), Latin Rim 
(62%) and Continental Europe (60%) are currently legally married. Instead, 
respondents from Nordic Sweden and Universal welfare states are more likely to 
have been divorced (20% Sweden, 6% Universal), or are currently divorced (7%, 
8%), separated (13%, 3%) or in other unconventional marital relationships (23%, 
13%). By contrast, higher percentages from Malta (26%), Continental (26%) and 
Latin Rim countries (28%) have never been married, than their counterparts from 
Nordic Sweden (5%). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of children they ever had. 
Relative to the IPROSEC average (1.72), respondents from universal welfare states 
(2.23), report the highest rate of children ever had, much higher than in Malta 
(1.84) and Latin Rim countries (1.64) or Continental (1.56) and Nordic (1.48) welfare 
states. In fact, considerable numbers never had any children in Latin Rim (34%) 
and Nordic (32%) welfare states, much higher than in post-communist countries 
(23%) or Universal (27%) welfare states. 
Single-person and/or single parent households are more common in Latin Rim 
(35%) and Nordic (30%) countries, in contrast to Mediterranean Malta (7%), 
Continental (16%) and Universal ( 15%) welfare states, or post -communist countries 
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(14%). In fact, the mean household adult occupancy is lowest in Nordic Sweden 
(1.88) but highest in Mediterranean Malta (2.83). At the same time, however, Latin 
Rim countries report the highest number of teenagers (57%), children aged between 
5 and 12 year olds (57%) as well as under five year old children (57%) living in 
their households. Similar findings suggest that whereas Nordic Sweden has higher 
rates of single-occupancy households, Latin Rim countries have higher rates of 
single-parent households with dependent children. [Tables 2,3,4]. 
Value priorities 
In all European countries under consideration, without distinction, the family 
has top priority. Thus, the majority of respondents from Mediterranean Malta (96% ), 
Universal (90%), Nordic (89%), Continental (86%), and Latin Rim (86%) welfare 
states but also post-communist applicant countries to the European Union (83%) 
find the family very important in their life. It seems that the value of the family, 
irrespective of an observed diversity in personal family arrangements, unites citizens 
of the European Union and its applicant members. 
Most member states of the European Union assign second importance to 
work closely followed by friends and leisure. They assign much less 
importance, however, to religion and politics. Universal and Nordic welfare 
states, however, displace the importance of work by friends and leisure time. 
[Table 5]. 
In contrast to Nordic Sweden (11 %) or the average European country (21 %), 
Mediterranean Malta (67%) and to a lower extent Latin Rim countries of the 
European Union (31%) find religion very important in life. Respondents in Malta 
(49%), however, are closer to Nordic Sweden (54%) and Universal welfare states 
( 45%) in the importance they assign to leisure-time than either their neighbouring 
Latin Rim (33%) or Continental (32%) European countries. It seems that Malta's 
greater interaction through overseas travel and tourism from Universal and Nordic 
states leads to a greater appreciation of leisure time, but not of friends and 
acquaintances. Similarly, Maltese respondents ( 13%) are closer to Nordic Sweden 
in the importance they assign to politics than their Continental (8%) or Latin Rim 
(6%) counterparts. Such an occurrence, however, does not seem to undermine their 
high regard of religion. A strategic distance from friends and acquaintances, which 
together with their close family ties, family-oriented work and leisure, remain 
distinctive characteristics of the Maltese national identity. In the same way, it is to 
be expected that closer ties and interaction between citizens of European Union 
• 
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member states and applicant countries, favour the sharing and shaping of common 
values but also a greater appreciation of national identities in an ever-widening 
European milieu in the making. 
Closely related to the value of the family is the legitimacy of marriage as a 
social institution. Just as with the overriding importance of the family, the majority 
of respondents in the European countries under consideration, with some variations 
between and within countries, find marriage as a valid institution. Thus, the greatest 
support for the institution of marriage is reported in Mediterranean Malta, closely 
followed by post-communist EU applicant countries, the Latin Rim and Nordic 
Sweden. A slightly lower majority support is obtained in the Continental and 
Universal welfare states of the European Union. With the exception of Nordic 
Sweden most respondents from the other European countries think that a long-
term relationship is important for a happy life, and that children need both parents 
to grow up happily. 
Overall in all the European welfare states under consideration, the majority 
(70%) are also of the opinion that parents are to do their utmost for their children. 
Similar percentages (72%), except in Nordic Sweden (44%), respondents think 
that children are always to love their parents. 
Moreover, all over Europe, irrespective of living arrangements, the majority 
(88%) are concerned about the well being of their immediate family, and a greater 
majority (94%) are willing to help members of their family. In this way, the values 
of marriage and the family or their alternative long-lasting stable family-type 
relationships serve as a foundation for the conviviality of people with different 
lifestyles. [Table 6]. 
Partners' issues 
Respondents from post-communist applicant countries, Mediterranean 
Malta, Latin Rim and Continental welfare states of the European Union are 
more likely to hold traditional views about family relationships than their 
counterparts from Nordic or Universal welfare states. Thus, most of the former 
unlike respondents from Nordic or Universal welfare states, agree that women 
and to a lesser extent men need to have children for fulfilment, that children 
need both parents to grow up happily, and that a long-term relationship is 
necessary for happiness. 
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Gender Issues 
Similarly, greater majorities from Nordic Sweden relative to other member and 
applicant countries of the European Union, support feminist positions on gender 
relations. Thus, respondents from Nordic Sweden are more supportive of working 
mothers with children (84%, compared to an overall68% in IPROSEC countries), 
women's independence through work (80%; 72% IPROSEC), for both partners to 
contribute to household income (88%; 76% IPROSEC), and that fathers are equally 
suited to look after children (91 %, 71% IPROSEC). By contrast, they are 
significantly less in agreement that pre-school children suffer when their mother 
works outside the home (36%; 57% IPROSEC; Malta [88%], Continental [66%] 
and Latin Rim [62%] welfare states in particular), that women prefer homemaking 
and child-caring (37%; 52% IPROSEC: Malta [69%], post-communist [65 %] and 
Latin Rim [59%] welfare states in particular), or that being a housewife is equally 
fulfilling as having a job (46%, 51% IPROSEC: Malta [86%], post-communist 
[55%] and Latin Rim [54%] welfare states in particular). Contrary to expectations, 
however, in contrast to their European counterparts (50%), respondents from Nordic 
Sweden are more of the opinion that men are Jess able to handle emotions than 
women (63% ). Such a situation suggests the cultural construction of country-specific 
feminist views on gender. [Table 7]. 
The meaning of marriage 
Similar to results from earlier studies (van den Akker, Halman and De Moor 
1993: 102; Abela 2000: 61), the analysis of marriage values in the eleven IPROSEC 
European countries has identified three basic orientations for a successful marriage. 
These consist of an interpersonal bond between partners, cultural homogeneity and 
situational conditions. The interpersonal bond in marriage is characterised by spending 
time together, discussing mutual problems, showing respect and appreciation, 
understanding and tolerance, talking about mutual interests, faithfulness, and to a 
lesser extent sharing household chores, enjoying happy sexual relationships and having 
children. Cultural homogeneity refers to partners' common social background, sharing 
religious beliefs and agreement on politics. Finally, situational conditions include 
living apart from in-laws, having happy sexual relations, an adequate income, good 
housing and sharing household chores. [Table 8]. 
In most European countries under consideration, interpersonal relationships 
between partners have primary importance whereas common cultural background 
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and situational conditions are of secondary importance. Thus Nordic Sweden just 
like Mediterranean Malta, the Latin Rim, Continental and Universal welfare states 
of the European Union attach great importance to interpersonal affective qualities 
including respect and appreciation, faithfulness , understanding and tolerance. But 
whereas Latin Rim and Continental welfare states give greater importance to 
companionship qualities like talking about mutual interests and spending time 
together, Nordic Sweden and Universal welfare states have a higher preference for 
partnership qualities like the discussion of mutual problems, respect and 
appreciation, and the sharing of household chores. Similarly, Mediterranean Malta 
and Latin Rim countries attach greater importance to situational conditions and 
cultural homogeneity between partners than their Nordic counterparts. All this 
suggests that citizens of Nordic Sweden and Universal welfare states are more 
likely to hold post-traditional and post-materialist values than their Mediterranean 
and Latin Rim counterparts. [Table 9] . 
The culture shift towards postmaterialism observable in the public spheres of 
the advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1990, 1997) has its counterpart in the 
private and intimate sphere of marriage and the family. In most European countries, 
it seems that postmaterialism and its post-traditional component are most evident 
in the changing values of marriage and the family. The silent revolution is embedded 
in the transformation of the meaning of marriage where intimate interpersonal 
relationships have come to have pride of place. 
Value orientations 
As in earlier European studies values are organised into traditional-post-
traditional, materialist-post-materialist value orientations. For this purpose 
respondents were requested to choose five priorities from a list of eleven qualities 
they think important for children to be encouraged to learn at home. Indirectly such 
an exercise reveals the value priorities of respondents in a given society or country. 
This is because respondents ' options for the transmission of values to future 
generations are an expression of the deepest convictions. As in our previous studies, 
the main value orientations are identified through the application of factor analysis. 
This allows for comparisons between distinct social groups, societies and countries. 
The application of factor analysis to the eleven values under consideration 
extracts two factors for the eleven IPROSEC European countries taken together. 
Overall in the IRROSEC member and applicant countries of the EU the first factor 
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runs from a set of newly aspired qualities obtaining a negative polarity including 
independence, determination and perseverance, and responsibility to conventional 
attributes with a positive polarity for obedience, religious faith and good manners. 
The second factor extends from conventional society-oriented and materialist 
qualities obtaining a negative polarity for thrift, saving money and things and hard 
work to positive polarities for the newly aspired values of unselfishness, imagination, 
tolerance and respect. The first factor has a social conformity-autonomy orientation 
with contrasting traditional and post-traditional polarities, extending from conformity 
to external authority towards self-direction and a sense of responsibility. Then, the 
second factor represents the materialist-post-materialist orientation obtaining 
negative polarities for traditional hard work and materialist thrift, saving money 
and things and contrasting positive polarities for post-traditional and post-materialist 
qualities. [Table 10]. 
As in earlier studies of European (Harding et al. 1986) and Maltese values 
(Abela 1991, 1994, 1997), with some improvement to account for middle-ground 
positions, respondents choosing at least three out of five traditional values are 
identified as traditional whereas those choosing at least four out of six post -traditional 
qualities are identified as post-traditional. To ascertain a greater accuracy, similar 
to the classification of 'materialists', 'post-materialists' and 'mixed' materialists-
post-materialists on Inglehart's battery of questions, respondents opting for a mix 
of two traditional and three post-traditional qualities are identified as 'mixed' 
traditional-post-traditional. On this basis respondents are identified as traditional, 
'mixed' traditional-post-traditional or post-traditional depending on their value 
options. The measurement of traditionalism and post-traditionalism makes possible 
the comparison of groups of individuals constituting social groups, societies and 
countries. In this way respondents with diverse social characteristics are situated 
on the traditional-post-traditional continuum. 
Traditionalism and marriage values 
The analysis of marriage values by traditional and post-traditional value 
orientations reveals how post-traditionalists are more likely to understand marriage 
as a partnership where respect and appreciation, understanding and tolerance, 
discussing problems and happy sexual relations have pride of place. On the other 
hand, traditionalists give more importance to companionship, adequate socio-
economic conditions and the sharing of a common culture for success in marriage. 
Thus, traditionalists relative to post-traditionalists give more importance to 
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faithfulness, children, talking about mutual interests, spending time together, sharing 
household chores, adequate income, good housing, agreement on religion, politics 
and common social background. [Table 11]. 
Traditionalism and gender relations 
The analysis of marriage values by traditional and post-traditional value 
orientations reveals how traditionalists, in contrast to post-traditionalists favour 
close family ties. Thus traditionalists are more likely to think that people, women 
in particular, need to have children for fulfilment and that children need both parents 
to grow up happily. They are also more likely to require a long-term and stable 
relationship for a happy life. On the other hand, postmaterialists are more likely to 
think that marriage is an outdated institution, approve for a singe mother to raise a 
child without a stable relationship with a male partner, and do not see any necessary 
connection between happiness and having children. 
Similarly, post-traditionalists are more supportive of feminist issues including 
women's reconciliation of motherhood with a working career, women's 
independence through participation in the labour market, the contribution by both 
partners to household income, and for fathers' sharing in childcare responsibilities. 
By contrast, traditionalists differ significantly from their post-traditional counterparts 
in their strong views on how pre-school children suffer when their mother works 
outside the home, that women prefer to have a home and children, that housework 
is equally satisfying as working for pay, and that men are less able to handle their 
emotions. [Table 12]. 
Traditionalism in EU welfare states 
On the traditional-post traditional continuum, Nordic Sweden stands at the extreme 
post-traditional end whereas the post-communist EU applicant countries and 
Mediterranean Malta in particular, are situated at the extreme traditional end. Thus, 
in descending order of traditionalism we find Mediterranean Malta and post -communist 
applicant countries closely followed by Universal, Latin Rim, Continental and least 
of all Nordic welfare states of the European Union. [Table 13]. 
Issues in Social Policy 
The Values Study enquired about respondents' political orientations and their 
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priorities on a number of issues on politics and social policy. The series of questions 
under investigation are concerned with respondents' preferences between (1) left 
and right political ideologies; (2) their choice of either freedom or equality; their 
views on (3) competition as either good or harmful; (4) whether the state should 
give more freedom to firms or to control them more effectively; (5) whether 
individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves or for the 
state to ensure that everyone is provided for; ( 6) whether unemployed people should 
have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits or alternatively 
that they should have the right to refuse a job they do not want; (7) the importance 
or otherwise to guarantee basic needs for ali in terms of food, housing, clothes, 
education and health; (8) to recognize people on their own merits; and (9) to eliminate 
big inequalities in income between citizens. For a number of political and social 
policy issues respondents were requested to indicate their position on a 10-point or 
a 5-point scale, which for our purposes have been collapsed into three values (two 
opposite extremes and a middle value). 
A final question (10), designed by lnglehart (1990, 1997) for the construction 
of a materialism-postmaterialism index asked respondents to identify what they 
consider to be the first and second aims for the coming ten years in their country 
from a list of four items. On this basis respondents choosing two materialist qualities 
('maintaining order in the nation' and 'fighting rising prices') are identified as 
materialists, those choosing two post-materialists values ('giving people more say 
in important government decisions' and 'protecting freedom of speech') are post-
materialists, whereas those choosing a mix of one materialist and one post-materialist 
value are termed 'mixed' materialists/post-materialists. 
Social policy in European welfare states 
Overall in the European countries under consideration, very few respondents 
support extreme left or extreme right political ideologies. Instead, the majority 
favour middle ground positions standing between left and right political 
orientations. A higher percentage of respondents from Latin Rim, Nordic and 
Continental European welfare states support a left political ideology. Middle-
ground positions or 'third way' politics have the greatest support by respondents 
in Malta, post-communist applicant countries and Universal welfare states of the 
European Union. 
Similar political middle-ground positions are accompanied by a greater 
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preference for the principle of freedom over and above equality, and a support of 
the free market where the state has only a limited control over firms. Thus, many 
respondents from the countries under consideration, Nordic Sweden and Continental 
European welfare states in particular, agree that the unemployed should have to 
take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits. Very few agree that 
they should have the right to refuse a job they do not want. In fact, most respondents 
from Malta, the Latin Rim, Universal and Continental welfare states of the European 
Union, prefer middle-ground positions between a total imposition of duties by society 
and the protection of absolute individual rights. 
Middle-ground political ideologies are also supportive of joint welfare 
responsibilities to be shared by the individual and the state. Respondents from Nordic 
Sweden, Universal and Continental welfare states are more likely to agree that 
individuals should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. By contrast, 
respondents from post-communist applicant countries and Latin Rim welfare states 
of the European Union are more likely to agree that the state is to ensure that 
everyone is provided for. In most welfare states and applicant countries of the 
European Union there is a general consensus for the state to guarantee the basic 
needs for all in terms of food, housing, clothes, education and health (92% ); and to 
recognize people on their own merits (80% ). Fewer respondents, however, find 
important for the state to eliminate big inequalities in income between citizens. 
State intervention to ensure an egalitarian society is more supported by respondents 
from the Latin Rim and post-communist applicant countries than by their 
counterparts from Continental, Universal welfare states of the European Union; 
Malta and Nordic Sweden in particular. 
On Inglehart's index of materialism-postmaterialism, respondents from post-
communist EU applicant countries, closely followed by those from Mediterranean 
Malta are in the main materialists, whereas their counterparts from Nordic Sweden 
are more post-materialists. The majority of respondents from Continental, Universal, 
Latin Rim and Nordic welfare states, however, are 'mixed' materialists-
postmaterialists. [Table 14]. 
Post-traditionalism and social policy 
Finally, this section explores the relation between traditionalism/post-
traditionalism and respondents' options on issues of social policy in the welfare 
states under consideration. The social policy issues under consideration are cross-
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tabulated by post-traditionalism and in turn examined by the chi-square test of 
significance for relations between variables. 
Results show that there is a significant relation between post-traditionalism, 
political ideologies and most issues in social policy. Thus, on the one hand, 
traditionalists are more likely to support a right political orientation, give greater 
importance to equality over freedom, think of competition as harmful, expect the 
state to control firms more effectively, favour state responsibility for social welfare, 
give importance for state intervention to eliminate big income inequalities in society, 
and possess a materialist value orientation. By contrast, post-traditionalists and mixed 
traditionalists/post-traditionalists in particular, are more likely to support a left-wing 
or 'third way' political orientation, give greater importance to freedom over equality, 
favour competition and a measure of free enterprise, require individuals and 
intermediate social groupings to be responsible for the provision of their needs, give 
less importance for state intervention to eliminate big inequalities in society, and 
possess a post-materialist or mixed-materialist-postmaterialist value orientation. 
The greatest majority of traditionalists (92%), mixed traditionalist/post-
traditionalists (91%) and post-traditionalists (92% ), however, without distinction, 
give great importance for the state to guarantee basic needs for all in terms of food, 
housing, clothes, education and health. This suggests that in the European countries 
under consideration there is a widespread consensus for state intervention to 
guarantee a modicum of social welfare. After the elimination of material scarcity, 
however, the majority of respondents in the European welfare states under 
consideration tend to favour middle-ground positions requiring the joint efforts of 
the state, the individual and intermediate social groups for the provision of post-
materialist social needs. [Table 15]. 
The observed relationship between the present right-wing politics and egalitarian 
policies generally associated with political 'old left' ideologies is counterintuitive. 
It seems that in the European welfare states under consideration, the 'new left' is 
shifting towards a third way politics, reconciling traditionally liberal right-wing 
positions with new left-wing ideologies. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing analyses have identified the family values, value orientations 
and the corresponding options for social policy of representative citizens from 
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Continental, Universal, Latin Rim and Nordic welfare states as well as post-
communist and Mediterranean applicant countries of the European Union. The study 
has acknowledged differences but also similarities on specific values and social 
policies between and within the European countries under consideration. Irrespective 
of the observed differences over specific values, constituting distinct cultures and 
welfare state traditions, the study identified common orientations that cut across 
and serve as a potential source of unity between European countries. Accordingly, 
the traditional/post-traditional value orientation and its materialist/post-materialist 
component, common to a diversity of European welfare states, has a direct bearing 
on people's options for social policy. 
Results from the study give evidence on how the 'old' left-right political divide 
and the corresponding options in social welfare are giving way to middle-ground 
positions, variously identified as 'third way' politics. At a time when material scarcity 
has been eliminated, the majority of citizens in the European welfare states under 
consideration tend to favour third way policies requiring the joint effort of the 
state, individuals and intermediate social groupings to meet post-materialist social 
needs in a free-market society. Similar findings suggest that a culture shift is taking 
place from traditional materialism towards individualised postmaterialism displacing 
the various types of welfare states by increasingly complex multicultural and post-
traditional European welfare societies. 
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Table I. Respondents in IPROSEC and all other countries 
IPROSEC countries: Frequency Percent Sum Percent 
Wave/Welfare system 
1. Continental 
France 1615 4.2 4.2 
Germany 2036 5.2 9.4 
Italy 2000 5.1 14.5 
2. Universal 
United Kingdom 1000 2.6 17.1 
Northern Ireland 1000 2.6 19.7 
Ireland 1012 2.6 22.3 
3. Latin Rim 
Greece 1142 2.9 25.2 
Spain 1200 3.1 28.3 
4. Nordic 
Sweden 1015 2.6 30.9 
5. Post-communist 
Estonia 1005 2.6 33.5 
Hungary 1000 2.6 36.1 
Poland 1095 2.8 38.9 
AIIIPROSEC 15120 38.9 
6. Mediterranean/Latin Rim 
Malta 1002 2.6 41.5 
All other countries* 22759 58.5 100 
Total 38881 100 
------------ ---------------
* Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
















Table 2. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents in EU welfare systems* 
Con tin- Latin Post-
ental Universal Rim Nordic communist 
% % % % % 
Gender: 
Male 47 48 43 50 46 
Female 53 52 57 50 54 
age groups 
18-34 years 3 1 33 33 32 32 
35-54 years 36 36 35 39 37 
55+ years 32 3 1 32 29 31 
highest level of education 
inadequate education 8 20 2 1 0 9 
compl compulsory educ. 26 12 27 17 26 
compl elem ed+basic voc qual 14 I 6 25 
2nd, interm vocational qualification 4 14 5 19 2 
2nd, interm general qualification 15 14 15 16 3 
full 2nd maturity certificate 17 13 17 12 24 
higher educ- lower-level 3d cert 7 6 5 29 5 
higher educ- upper-level 3d cert 8 20 8 0 6 
IPROSEC 

























































Table 3. Employment in EU welfare systems 
Conti- Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
o/o o/o o/o o/o 
Chief wage earner 52 56 43 62 
Employed 
30h a week or more 36 36 33 53 
Less then 30h a week 9 II 9 10 
Self employed 6 8 7 2 
Retired/pensioned 22 18 13 35 
Housewife 13 IS 21 
Student 7 4 6 
Unemployed 5 7 5 
Other 2 I 4 
How long unemployed 
Less than half a year 25 25 30 
Half/one year 16 9 18 
One year 6 7 22 
One -two years II 8 6 
Two years 5 4 2 
+Two years 38_ 47 22 
Notes: EC = European countries 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta 11 EC 
o/o o/o o/o 
53 47 52 
42 40 38 
5 3 8 
4 4 6 
29 IS 22 
4 31 12 
5 3 5 
8 4 6 
2 2 
27 5 26 
23 IS 17 
8 7 10 
8 10 9 
6 10 5 















































Table 4. Living arrangements in EU welfare systems 
Conti- Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
% % % % 
Living arrangements 
Living with parents 17 18 22 6 
Stable relationship 67 61 71 68 
of which: 
Legally married to partner 87 68 86 70 
stable relationship before 28 45 28 46 
Current legal marital status 
Married 60 48 62 47 
Widowed 7 8 7 3 
Divorced 5 8 I 7 
Separated 2 3 I 15 
Never married 26 21 28 5 
Other 13 23 
Been divorced 5 6 3 20 
Number of children ever had 
0 29 27 34 32 
Mean 1.56 2.23 1.64 1.48 
Adults in household over 18 years: 
I 16 15 35 30 
2 50 49 3 1 56 
3+ 34 36 33 15 
Mean 2.37 2.50 2.22 1.88 
One or more children in household 
13-17 years old 17 25 57 15 
5-12 years old 20 27 57 19 
Under 5 years 12 17 53 10 
Notes: * weighted cases by age, EC = European countries 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta 11 EC 
% % % 
21 21 18 
69 76 68 
85 85 82 
18 22 28 
59 67 57 
II 5 8 
7 0 5 
I 2 3 
22 26 23 
4 
9 I 7 
23 31 28 
1.65 1.84 1.72 
14 7 19 
47 43 47 
38 50 34 
2.46 2.83 2.36 
22 25 26 
23 23 28 























































Table 5. Value priorities in EU welfare systems 
Conti Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
% % % % 
Very important in life: 
Work 58 43 60 54 
Family 86 90 86 89 
Friends acquaintances 44 61 36 71 
Leisure time 32 45 33 54 
Politics 8 6 6 II 
Religion 18 24 31 II 
Table 6. Marriage and family relations in EU welfare systems 
Conti- Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
% % % % 
Marriage valid institution 77 76 85 80 
Long-term relationship to be happy 63 35 70 41 
Children need both oarents 88 64 89 56 
Immediate family 
Concerned about 89 75 94 97 
Willing to help 95 93 96 98 
Parents-children relationships 
Do utmost best for children 68 78 75 67 
No sacrifice of well-being 21 13 15 22 
Neither II 9 10 10 
Children-JJarents relationshivs 
Always love parents 69 71 78 44 
Parents have to earn respect 31 29 22 56 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta llEC 
% % % 
62 75 56 
83 96 86 
29 32 45 
25 49 35 
5 13 7 
24 67 22 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta 11 EC 
% % % 
86 93 80 
77 64 60 
95 92 82 
93 96 88 
93 99 94 
65 92 70 
21 5 18 
14 3 II 
81 92 72 


























































Table 7. Partners' and gender issues in EU welfare systems 
Conti- Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
% % % % 
Partners' issues 
Women need children 55 16 58 23 
Men need children 44 14 43 
Children need both parents 88 64 89 56 
Woman single parent 34 3 1 46 30 
Marriage outdated 2 1 22 14 19 
Long-term relationship to be happy 63 35 70 41 
Gender issues 
Working mother and children 67 69 70 84 
Job independence women 77 57 76 80 
Household income contribution 75 66 78 88 
Fathers looking after children 71 66 66 9 1 
Children suffer with working mother 66 36 62 36 
Women want home and children 53 35 59 37 
Being a housewife 48 52 54 46 
Men handling emotions 49 49 47 63 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta II EC 
% % % 
74 44 49 
63 34 39 
95 92 82 
35 IS 35 
13 6 19 
77 64 60 
65 59 68 
7 1 44 72 
83 7 1 76 
72 62 71 
65 88 57 
65 69 52 
55 86 51 















































Table 8. Factor Analysis of Marriage values in II IPROSEC European countries 
Fl F2 . 
Discuss problems 0.68 -0.06 
Respect & appreciation 0.63 -0.01 
Understand & tolerance 0.62 -0.02 
Talk mutual interests 0.62 0.17 
Spend time together 0.59 0.16 
Faithfulness 0.54 0.14 
Children 0.36 0.23 
Happy sexual relations 0.29 -0.08 
Same social background 0.02 0.73 
Same religious beliefs 0.21 0.72 
Agree on politics 0.07 0.68 
Apart from in-laws 0.00 0.00 
Adequate income -0.07 0.48 
Good housing 0.05 0.52 
Share household chores 0.34 0.05 
































Table 9. Marriage values in EU welfare system 
Conti- Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
o/o o/o o/o o/o 
very important in marriaRe: 
Respect & appreciation 86 83 85 94 
Faithful ness 83 92 84 88 
Understand & tolerance 80 82 83 87 
Discuss problems 72 85 77 81 
Happy sexual relations 61 66 69 59 
Children 55 52 72 58 
Talk mutual interests 54 so 59 43 
Spend time tol(ether 47 55 57 37 
AQart from in-laws 47 45 41 41 
Household chores 29 49 41 52 
Adequate income 30 38 51 19 
Good housin11: 27 40 48 29 
Same reli11:ious beliefs 17 24 33 13 
Same social background 14 22 24 7 
A~>ree on oolitics 8 8 16 6 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta II EC 
o/o o/o o/o 
81 97 85 
77 97 84 
72 94 80 
67 95 75 
61 81 63 
72 69 61 
42 82 so 
48 87 so 
48 56 45 
38 54 38 
43 40 37 
46 38 37 
22 57 21 
13 51 17 













































Table I 0. Factor Analysis of traditional/post-traditional values in II IPROSEC countries 
Fl F2 
Obedience 0.63 -0.02 
Independence -0.51 0.28 
Reli2ious faith 0.49 0.01 
Determination & perseverance -0.45 0.04 
Feelin2 of responsibility -0.44 0.05 
Good manners 0.36 0.04 
Hard work 0.07 -0.63 
Thrift 0.16 -0.54 
Unselfishness 0.28 0.51 
Imal(ination -0.12 0.46 
Tolerance and respect 0.02 0.40 




















Respect & appreciation 87 84 
Understand & tolerance 84 79 
Discuss problems 77 74 
Happy sexual relations 63 64 
Faithfulness 79 85 
Children 51 63 
Talk mutual interests 48 51 
Spend time to"ether 42 51 
Apart from in-laws 45 46 
Household chores 35 38 
Adequate income 26 38 
Good housing 25 38 
Same religious beliefs 9 20 
Same social background 10 16 
















































Women need children 39 51 
Men need children 27 41 
Children need both parents 75 84 
Long-term relationship to be happy 50 61 
Marriage outdated 23 19 
Woman single parent 40 36 
Gender issues 
Worki ng mother and children 76 69 
Job independence women 77 72 
Household income contribution 77 76 
Fathers looking after children 78 71 
Children suffer with working mother 49 57 
Women want home and children 37 53 
Being a housewife 39 52 
Men handling emotions 46 50 
Table 13. Traditionalism in EU welfare states 
Conti- Latin Post-
nental Universal Rim Nordic communist 
% % % % % 
Post-traditional 40 22 25 65 17 
Mixed 33 36 40 28 34 






























































Table 14. Social Policy in EU welfare states 
Conti- Latin 
nental Universal Rim Nordic 
% % % % 
I. political ideolORY 
a) left 20 II 25 22 
b) middle way 66 77 59 62 
c) right 14 12 16 16 
2.freedom or equality 
freedom above eQuality 50 52 48 62 
neither 9 7 6 4 
eQuality above freedom 40 41 46 35 
3. competition ROOd or harmful 
a) competition good 44 47 40 55 
b) middle way 44 46 48 41 
c) competition harmful 12 7 12 4 
4. firms and freedom 
a) state to give freedom to firms 37 31 22 46 
b) middle way 43 55 49 48 
c) state to control firms 20 14 29 6 
5. individual versus state 
a) individual responsibility 38 37 20 41 
b) middle way 44 49 51 51 
c) state responsibility 17 14 29 8 
6. unemployed take any j ob 
a) take any job 51 28 35 50 
!:>}_middle way 35 48 48 40 
c) right to refuse a job 14 24 17 10 
7. basic needs for all 
d) important 91 94 94 88 
e) middle way 6 5 4 8 
f) not important 2 I 2 4 
Post- IPROSEC 
communist Malta 11 EC 
% % % 
13 8 18 
70 78 68 
16 15 14 
51 57 51 
8 4 8 
41 38 4 1 
48 63 45 
41 32 44 
II 5 10 
18 34 30 
39 45 46 
43 21 24 
18 33 3 1 
51 45 48 
31 23 21 
36 28 4 1 
39 48 41 
25 24 18 
92 96 92 
6 3 6 


























































l:l. recognizing merits 
d) important 77 82 80 75 86 88 80 
e) middle way 16 13 14 18 9 9 14 
f) not important 7 5 6 7 4 3 6 
9. eliminating inequalities 
d) important 63 62 83 45 74 36 67 
e) middle way 25 26 13 32 19 32 22 
f) not important 12 12 4 24 7 32 II 
10. postmateriailsm 
materialists 23 21 23 6 43 35 26 
Mixed 56 62 60 71 53 57 58 
post-materialists 21 16 17 22 4 7 16 




























Table 15. Traditionalism and social policies in IPROSEC countries, and chi-square tests 
post-traditional Mixed traditional 
% % % 
I. political ideology 
a) left 24 17 13 
b) mjddle way 66 69 68 
c) right 10 14 19 
2. freedom or equality 
freedom above equality 56 49 49 
Neither 8 8 7 
equality above freedom 36 43 44 
3. competition good or harmful 
a) competition good 44 47 44 
b) mjddle way 46 43 44 
c) competition harmful 10 10 12 
4.firms and freedom 
a) state gives freedom to firms 33 31 26 
b) middle way 49 45 43 
c) state control firms 19 23 30 
5. individual versus state 
a) individual responsibility 35 3 1 28 
b) middle way 50 48 46 
c) state responsibility 16 21 25 
6. unemployed take any job 
a) take any job 37 41 45 
b) middle way 44 41 38 
c) right to refuse a job 19 19 17 
7. basic needs for all 
d) important 92 91 92 
e) middle way 6 6 6 
























Pearson Chi-Square Tests 
Value df Sig. 
242.1 4 0.000 
67.4 4 0.000 
21.4 4 0.000 
188.0 4 0.000 
145.2 4 0.000 
57.9 4 0.000 
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8. reco~Znizin!Z merits 
d) imoortant 78 81 83 80 
e) middle way 16 14 12 14 
f) not imoortant 7 5 5 6 
9. eliminatin~Z inequalities 
d) imoortant 62 67 72 67 
e) middle way 26 22 20 22 
f) not imoortant 13 II 8 II 
I 0. oostmaterialism 
Materialists 15 24 37 26 
Mixed 57 6 1 55 58 
post-materialists 27 14 8 16 
Notes: respondents scoring (a) 1-3, (b) 4-7, (c) 8-10, on 10 point scale; (d) 1-2, (e) 3, (t) 4-5, on 5-point scale. 
45.9 4 0.000 
117.7 4 0.000 
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